Argentina v Venezuela? Notes on Diplomatic Tensions and Worldwide Dispute Settlement – EJIL: Speak! – Tech Cyber Internet

On 8 December 2024, Venezuelan authorities detained Argentine navy police officer Nahuel Agustín Gallo after he entered the nation from Colombia. In response to Argentina’s Ministry of International Affairs, Gallo first travelled by automobile to Chile, then by aircraft to Bogotá, and eventually by taxi to the Venezuelan border with the intention to reunite along with his Venezuelan associate and their two-year-old youngster. On 27 December, the Venezuelan Public Ministry, led by Legal professional-Common Tarek William Saab, introduced prison fees towards Gallo for alleged terrorist actions, accusing him of concealing a ‘prison plan’ below the guise of a household go to. Argentina’s International Minister Gerardo Werthein dismissed these accusations, calling the detention arbitrary and insisting that Gallo’s sole objective was to spend time along with his household.

This incident has heightened diplomatic tensions between the 2 nations. Since March 2024, Venezuela has closed its airspace to any plane coming from or going to Argentina in response to Argentina’s handover of a seized Venezuelan cargo aircraft to US authorities. In July, after the Venezuelan presidential election, diplomatic relations between Argentina and Venezuela in the end broke down. The Argentine authorities below Javier Milei was among the many first worldwide to recognise Edmundo González Urrutia as Venezuela’s president-elect, dismissing Nicolás Maduro’s victory as a ‘fraud’ and condemning him as a ‘dictator’. In response, Maduro’s authorities expelled Argentina’s diplomatic and consular personnel from Venezuela. The departure of Argentine officers left six Venezuelan asylum seekers stranded inside the diplomatic premises, and the compound was positioned below Brazil’s custody. The embassy has since been surrounded by cops and subjected to energy outages and meals shortagessparking worry for the protection of the asylum seekers – significantly in gentle of Ecuador’s intrusion into the Mexican Embassy in Quito in April 2024.

On 2 January 2025, the Argentine authorities introduced that it had filed a ‘criticism earlier than the Worldwide Prison Court docket (ICC)’ based mostly on the ‘arbitrary detention and compelled disappearance’ of Nahuel Gallo. Hours later, Argentina introduced it had additionally requested provisional measures from the Inter-American Fee on Human Rights (IACHR).

This publish examines the Argentine authorities’s authorized responses to the detention of Nahuel Gallo and argues that they miss the prospect to comprehensively deal with the diplomatic tensions. It first contends that Argentina’s resort to the ICC is primarily symbolic and, whereas it may very well be argued that it might serve to deliver consideration to human rights abuses in Venezuela, it’s in the end unlikely to assist shield Gallo. It then means that, whereas seemingly extra appropriate, Argentina’s request to the IACHR can even face critical hurdles to both shield Gallo or assist clear up the broader bilateral battle. General, the publish emphasises {that a} real response to the rising tensions requires a critical dedication to worldwide dispute decision.

The ‘Criticism’ earlier than the ICC: A Technique in Search of Goal?

Argentine media rapidly amplified the Ministry of International Affairs’ announcement that the federal government had lodged a ‘criticism’ with the ICC. ‘Argentina takes Venezuela to [the] Worldwide Prison Court docket’proclaimed the Buenos Aires Occasions. The press assertion learn:

[Argentina] has filed a criticism with the Worldwide Prison Court docket (ICC) for the arbitrary detention and compelled disappearance of the Argentine citizen Nahuel Gallo, which occurred on December 8, 2024 within the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, pointing to Legal professional Common Tarek William Saab within the framework of this case.

This reality constitutes a critical and flagrant violation of human rights, evidencing a scientific sample of crimes towards humanity which can be being dedicated within the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, that are clearly below the jurisdiction of the ICC.

Taken collectively, the press launch and subsequent information protection advised that a world decide or prosecutor might swiftly intervene on Gallo’s behalf. Certainly, this isn’t the primary time Argentina has made such an announcement: earlier in December, the International Ministry equally introduced it had submitted a ‘criticism’ to the ICC over the siege of the Argentine embassy in Caracas. Nevertheless, the Rome Statute doesn’t allow states to file a ‘criticism’ on this method.

Though the Argentine authorities has not shared the paperwork it supplied to the ICC, it most definitely submitted what is called an ‘Article 15 communication’ to the Workplace of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the ICC. Below Article 15(1) of the Rome Statute, the OTP could start investigations ‘on the idea of data on crimes inside the jurisdiction of the Court docket’. Whereas the OTP receives tons of of communications yearly offering data on alleged crimes, largely from people and NGOs, the overwhelming majority don’t result in additional ICC motion. Article 15 communications can assist elevate public consciousness as a part of broader communication methods, however they seldom immediate fast investigative or judicial motion.

The Venezuelan authorities, for its half, retorted:

The Argentine authorities below Milei as soon as once more places on a disgraceful spectacle, stumbling from one worldwide embarrassment to a different. Invoking the Rome Statute—clearly unfamiliar to them—to gas their unhealthy political obsession reveals not solely ignorance however a surprising lack of seriousness.

Argentina’s determination to invoke the ICC on this method appears to purpose in direction of publicly criticising the Venezuelan authorities quite than securing a sensible decision for Gallo’s detention or the broader diplomatic disaster. As Natalie Hodgson notesan Article 15 communication can function a method of ‘sociological criminalisation’, whereby civil society actors – or, on this case, a state – search extralegal accountability by broadcasting alleged wrongdoing, even when no near-term ICC intervention is anticipated.

Nevertheless, the ICC has already opened an investigation into potential crimes towards humanity in Venezuela. It did so in 2021, following the OTP’s conclusion that there was ‘an inexpensive foundation to consider that crimes towards humanity, significantly within the context of detention, have been dedicated in Venezuela since a minimum of April 2017’. Whereas the ICC investigation continues at an apparently measured tempo, an Article 15 communication on Gallo’s case is unlikely to change its trajectory, significantly given the continuing bilateral tensions between Argentina and Venezuela and the still-disputed info surrounding Gallo’s detention.

Crucially, states wield far larger diplomatic and authorized sources than the NGOs and teams of residents that are inclined to submit Article 15 communications. If Argentina’s precedence is to guard Gallo, it could deploy extra direct and sustained channels of engagement (e.g., diplomatic negotiations, regional mediation, or recourse to adjudicatory our bodies). Towards this backdrop, Argentina’s ‘criticism’ seems, at greatest, a symbolic gesture unlikely to affect the continuing ICC course of considerably.

The Request to the IACHR: Protecting Motion on Gallo’s Behalf?

Hours after asserting that it had resorted to the ICC, the Argentine authorities knowledgeable that it had additionally requested provisional measures from the IACHR. It’s doable that the federal government was unaware that solely a day earlier the IACHR had already adopted precautionary measures requesting Venezuela to safeguard Gallo’s rights and well-being, make clear his custody circumstances, guarantee entry to authorized counsel and relations, and examine the occasions resulting in his detention to forestall future recurrences (Decision 1/2025). The choice on precautionary measures didn’t point out Argentina because the requesting get together; as a substitute, it talked about the CASLA Institute, a Prague-based organisation that has lengthy scrutinised Maduro’s authorities.

Had the IACHR not adopted precautionary measures earlier than, the Argentine request might need helped shield Gallo. However, the Argentine authorities’s attraction to the IACHR underscores an extra set of authorized hurdles tied to Venezuela’s tumultuous relationship with the Group of American States (OAS). In 2013, Venezuela withdrew from the American Conference on Human Rightsrenouncing the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court docket of Human Rights. Shortly after, Maduro additionally denounced the OAS Charterthus ceasing to be topic to the jurisdiction of the IACHR.

At the moment, Venezuela stays in a authorized gray space concerning its OAS membership. In 2019, OAS Secretary-Common Luis Almagro acknowledged Juan Guaido as Venezuela’s performing president. The OAS Common Meeting additionally accepted Guaidó’s appointed consultant. Guaidó’s ‘interim authorities’ then reversed the treaty denunciations launched by Maduro’s authorities (see, for instance, right here and right here). In 2022, the interim authorities was dissolved, leaving Venezuela with no official consultant earlier than the OAS. This unsettled standing complicates the Fee’s potential to speak with Venezuelan authorities or safe the enforcement of its measures.

Below these circumstances, makes an attempt to interact Maduro’s authorities by way of the OAS are unlikely to yield tangible outcomes. Since Maduro now not considers Venezuela certain by OAS obligations, any selections from the Fee or different OAS our bodies threat being ignored. Including to the problem, solely hours after the IACHR issued its determination on provisional measures, the OAS Secretary-Common launched a press assertion asserting that ‘the case involving gendarme Gallo constitutes against the law towards humanity below the Rome Statute of the Worldwide Prison Court docket’with out significant authorized or factual evaluation. As soon as once more, publicity seems to have overshadowed substantive authorized or diplomatic efforts – this time not simply on Argentina’s half however throughout the Inter-American System.

Conclusion

The Argentine authorities has professional grounds for concern: an Argentine citizen is detained in Venezuela with restricted data on his circumstances, and the Argentine Embassy in Caracas, together with the asylum seekers it shelters, has been below siege. On this setting, authorized and institutional mechanisms past conventional inter-state courts and tribunals can certainly function worthwhile instruments. Nevertheless, Argentina’s recourse to the ICC and the IACHR seems extra performative than sensible. The ‘criticism’ to the ICC dangers misrepresenting the Court docket’s objective and procedures, whereas the IACHR route is undermined by Venezuela’s withdrawal from the OAS, which might now not be significantly ignored.

A simpler strategy would confront not solely Gallo’s detention but in addition the overarching bilateral disaster, together with the siege of the embassy. International Minister Werthein’s earlier reference to a doable mediation – facilitated by Colombia, France, or Brazil – holds extra promise on this regard. Even inviting Venezuela to simply accept the jurisdiction of the Worldwide Court docket of Justice may supply Argentina a extra appropriate venue to current its claims in full. Though Venezuela is unlikely to take part, instituting proceedings would a minimum of enable Argentina to anchor its place in devices such because the Vienna Conference on Consular Relations and regional treaties on diplomatic asylum. This technique may yield a extra complete account of Argentina’s place than an Article 15 communication narrowly targeted on framing Gallo’s detention as against the law towards humanity. This account, in flip, may present stronger groundwork for stabilising bilateral relations.

Lastly, a sustainable decision calls for grappling with the broader regional dynamics during which this battle is unfolding. Though ideological friction between Presidents Milei and Maduro has escalated bilateral tensions, this incident reveals a rising fracture in Latin American relations. Venezuela’s expulsion of the international diplomatic personnel of seven nations and estrangement from the OAS underscores the necessity for a extra cohesive regional technique. Latin America’s authorized frameworks have traditionally supported the peaceable settlement of worldwide disputes and inter-state peace extra broadly; constructing on that custom, as a substitute of resorting to headline-grabbing authorized manoeuvres, stays essentially the most promising path to an everlasting answer.